اولا التقارير الخاصه بالاخ MIG 21 FIGHTER
Egypt suspected of nuclear tests
VIENNA, Austria (AP) — The U.N. atomic watchdog agency has found
evidence of secret nuclear experiments in Egypt that could be used in
weapons programs, diplomats said yesterday.
The diplomats told The Associated Press that most of the work was
carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, but said the International Atomic
Energy Agency also was looking at evidence suggesting some work was
performed as recently as a year ago.
Egypt’s government rejected claims it is or has been pursuing a weapons
program, saying its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.
“A few months ago we denied these kinds of claims and we do so again,”
Egyptian government spokesman Magdy Rady said. “Nothing about our
nuclear program is secret, and there is nothing that is not known to the
But one of the diplomats said the Egyptians “tried to produce various
components of uranium” without declaring it to the IAEA, as they were
bound to under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The products
included several pounds of uranium metal and uranium tetrafluoride — a
precursor to uranium hexafluoride gas, the diplomat said on condition of
Uranium metal can be processed into plutonium, while uranium
hexafluoride can be enriched into weapons-grade uranium — both for use
in the core of nuclear warheads.
The diplomat said the Vienna-based IAEA had not yet drawn a conclusion
about the scope and purpose of the experiments. But the work appeared to
have been sporadic, involved small amounts of material and lacked a
particular focus, the diplomat said.
That, he said, indicated that the work was not directly geared toward creating a full-scale program to make nuclear weapons.
The diplomat said that Egypt’s program was not “cohesive.”
“It’s not like Iran, where there was a clear plan to produce” uranium
hexafluoride, the gas that turns into enriched uranium when spun in
centrifuges, he said.
He also warned against comparisons to South Korea, which conducted
larger-scale plutonium and uranium experiments in 1982 and 2000 without
reporting them to the agency.
Iran, which the United States accuses of having nuclear weapons
ambitions, developed a full-fledged uranium enrichment program over
nearly two decades of clandestine activity revealed only in mid 2002.
Iran says it plans to enrich only to levels used to generate nuclear
fuel and not to weapons-grade uranium.
In Vienna, IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky said the agency would not comment on the revelations about Egypt.
Cairo has denied in the past it is trying to develop a nuclear weapons program.
The country appeared to turn away from the pursuit of such a program
decades ago. The Soviet Union and China reportedly rebuffed its requests
for nuclear arms in the 1960s, and by the 1970s, Egypt gave up the idea
of building a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant.
“We’ve seen the reports and I don’t think we have anything to offer at
this point except what we’ve said all along, which is, we expect all
nations to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency,” White
House spokesman Scott McClellan said. “We’re sure they will look into
this matter and I would just point out that Egypt is a signatory to the
Egypt runs small-scale nuclear programs for medical and research purposes, and Rady said the IAEA is monitoring that program.
“Nothing about our nuclear program is secret and there is nothing that
is not known to the IAEA,” he said. “We don’t have a secret program for
energy. All our program is known.”
Plans were floated as recently as 2002 to build the country’s first
nuclear power reactor. But no construction date has been announced, and
the pro-government Al-Ahram Weekly reported late last year that the
plant site near the coastal town of Al-Dabaa might be sold to make way
for tourism development.
Yesterday’s revelations come two months after diplomats told the AP that
the IAEA had discovered plutonium particles near an Egyptian nuclear
Back then, Egypt’s foreign and energy ministers rejected the reports —
but the diplomat again verified them yesterday, adding that the agency
has not been able to determine if those traces were evidence of a secret
weapons program or simply the byproduct of peaceful research
IAEA confirms: Egypt has nuclear weapons program
For years, we’ve been
arguing that Egypt is running a low-profile
military nuclear program. Some Israeli intelligence analysts share our
view based on the fact that Egypt operates lab-size nuclear reactors.
This view is unpopular among Israeli and American politicians because the only rational course of action, attacking the Egyptian reactors, is not feasible due to the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s officials leaked the 2007 and
2008 reports which prove that weapons-grade uranium has been found near
Inshas, where the Egyptian nuclear reactors are located.
The Egyptians have been evasive on this matter, ludicrously blaming the
uranium traces on medical radio isotopes used in their program.
Now it is absolutely certain that Egypt has very slowly been
accumulating uranium, enriching it in its research facilities in order
to make a small number of nuclear weapons. It is no less certain that
the gutless Israeli government will keep its head in the sand and stick
to the fake peace treaty instead of bombing the Egyptian nuclear
The IAEA leak can possibly be attributed to Iran, which sought to
embarrass Egypt after their recent feud, but more likely it is the work
of American diplomats who thus send Israel a message that she cannot go
on bombing all the reactors in the vicinity, and must put up with a
High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt: IAEA
(Reuters) - The U.N. nuclear watchdog is investigating the discovery of
traces of highly enriched uranium at a nuclear research site in Egypt,
according to a restricted International Atomic Energy Agency report
obtained by Reuters.
It did not specify whether the particles were weapons-grade -- enriched
to a level high enough for use as fuel for an atom bomb, as opposed to
fuel for some nuclear reactors. An IAEA official reached by Reuters said
this was being checked.
The report, which described global IAEA work in 2008 to verify
compliance with non-proliferation rules, said the highly enriched
uranium (HEU) traces turned up in environmental swipe samples taken at
the Inshas nuclear research site in 2007-08.
The HEU was discovered alongside particles of low-enriched uranium (LEU), the type used for nuclear power plant fuel.
Egypt had explained to the IAEA that it believed the HEU "could have
been brought into the country through contaminated radio-isotope
transport containers," the May 5 report said.
The U.N. watchdog's inspectors had not yet verified the source of the
particles, it said, but there were no indications that Egypt's
clarification was not correct.
The IAEA was in any case continuing an investigation to establish the
provenance of the traces, with further test sampling planned in the
vicinity near the capital Cairo.
The IAEA is sensitive to possible nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East because of inquiries into allegations of secret weapons-oriented
nuclear activity in Iran and Syria, which both countries deny, and the 2003 exposure of a covert atomic bomb program in Libya, since scrapped.
PAST IAEA PROBLEMS WITH EGYPT
In February 2005, an IAEA report chided Egypt for repeatedly failing to
declare nuclear sites and materials but said inspectors had found no
sign of an atom bomb program.
At the time, IAEA diplomats said Egypt's breaches appeared minor compared to those of Iran and South Korea,
both of which experimented with uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing -- technologies applicable to nuclear bomb-making.
The new report said Egypt told the IAEA in 2004 that its atomic energy
agency lacked the means to ensure "effective control" over all nuclear
work in the country. A presidential decree was issued in 2006 to
strengthen the agency's powers.
Egyptian regulators then mounted a state-wide investigation and detected
previously undocumented nuclear items, including depleted uranium, a
by-product of enrichment used as a hardening agent in ordnance or as
The report said Egypt had turned over information about previously
undeclared nuclear work and submitted design information about the
Inshas facility, a hydrometallurgy pilot plant and a radio-isotope
Egypt's statements were judged consistent with IAEA findings and there were no more outstanding questions, it said.
In 2007 Egypt said it aimed to build several atomic reactors to meet
rising energy demand and has since received nuclear cooperation offers
from China, Russia, France and Kazakhstan.
Many Arab states have similar ambitions, to offset high fossil-fuel costs and cut emissions to combat climate change.
Industry analysts have suggested the United States could be willing to
help Egypt develop a nuclear program if it pledged never to enrich
uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel -- both proliferation-prone
processes -- on its own soil.
Egypt ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1981 but not the IAEA's
1997 Additional Protocol that gives inspectors the right to make
intrusive, short-notice inspections of nuclear facilities and other
sites not declared as nuclear.
Nuclear Weapons Program
Egypt has not engaged in significant efforts to develop a nuclear
weapons capability. Evidently Egypt has decided to concentrate on
increasing conventional forces, and chemical and biological weapons,
rather than developing nuclear weapons.
The Egyptian nuclear program was launched in 1954. Egypt acquired its
first nuclear reactor from the Soviet Union in 1961. The two megawatt
reactor was opened by President Gamal Abdel-Nasser at Inchass, in the
Nile Delta. The Soviets controlled the disposal of this small nuclear
research reactor's spent fuel, which in any event was not capable of
producing a significant amount of weapons-grade material. Egyptian
nuclear ambitions were discarded following the 1967 defeat at the hands
of Israel. Egypt signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) in 1968 but delayed ratifying it, presumably because the
government had evidence that Israel had embarked on a nuclear weapons
program. Subsequently, Egypt lost many of its nuclear experts who had to
travel abroad to seek work opportunities. Some emigrated to Canada and
others joined the Iraqi nuclear program.
At the same time, however, serious work on developing nuclear potential
designated for use in power engineering, agriculture, medicine,
biotechnology, and genetics continues. Industrial incorporation of four
explored uranium deposits is planned, including the extraction and
enrichment of uranium for subsequent use as fuel for atomic power
In 1975 the United States agreed in principle on a program to supply
Egypt with power reactors. The US promised to provide Egypt with eight
nuclear power plants and the necessary cooperation agreements were
signed. The plan was subject to a trilateral safeguards agreement signed
by the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and
Egypt. In the late 1970s, the US unilaterally revised the bilateral
agreements and introduced new conditions that were unacceptable to the
Egyptian government. As a result, the decision was taken to ratify the
NPT, with one goal in mind � the implementation of a nuclear power
Although financing problems stalled construction of power reactors from
the United States, Egypt ratified the NPT in 1981, in order to be able
to conclude agreements with other countries for the construction of
atomic energy-production facilities. Before his assassination in 1981,
President Anwar Sadat announced plans to build two nuclear power
stations along the Mediterranean coast. These plans, though, were
subsequently shelved. There are [poorly attested] reports that Egypt is
planning a Chinese-made power reactor, variously assessed at between 300
MW and 600 MW, that could have the capacity to produce material for the
production of as many as four nuclear warheads a month. Egypt is
believed to be seeking joint nuclear weapons research with Syria and
Saudi Arabia to defray costs and allow Fgypt to continue its
conventional military buildup.
In early 1992, a deal was made for Argentina to deliver one more reactor
with a capacity of 22 megawatts to Egypt. The contract signed in 1991
for the delivery to Egypt of a Russian MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator
remains in force. Since 1990 Egypt has been a member of the Arab Power
Engineering Organization uniting 11 countries. A number of Egyptian
scientific projects are being carried out under the aegis of the IAEA.
There are bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use of atomic
energy with Germany, the United States, Russia, India, China, and
Argentina. There are, moreover, agreements with Great Britain and India
to provide assistance in training national cadres for scientific
research and work on the country's atomic enterprises.
Egypt has subscribed to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. Since 1974, Egypt has taken the initiative of proposing to
render the Middle East nuclear-weapons free zone, calling all countries
in the region without exception to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). In April 1990, Egypt took the initiative to render the
Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The 1991 Madrid Peace
Conference established a multinational mechanism to work on making the
Middle East a nuclear weapon-free zone. This mechanism, however, stalled
three years ago as a result of the Israeli position. Egypt hosted in
April 1996 the conference for signing the declaration on rendering
Africa a nuclear-weapons free zone.
In late 2004 and early 2005, the International Atomic Energy Agency was
investigating previously undisclosed experiments performed by Egyptian
scientists involving uranium metal.
Egypt failed to disclose nuclear facilities, material, and experiments
to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), according to a Feb. 14
report from agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei. There is no
indication, however, that Egypt has a nuclear weapons program, and Cairo has either ceased the nuclear activities in question or placed them under IAEA monitoring.
The report labels Egypt’s reporting failures “a matter of concern” but
adds that Egypt has cooperated with the investigation, and the agency’s
findings so far are consistent with Egypt’s account of its nuclear
IAEA safeguards agreements require states-parties to the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to disclose certain civilian nuclear
activities. They also allow the agency to monitor the countries’ nuclear
facilities to ensure the facilities are not used to produce nuclear
weapons. Egypt acceded to the NPT in 1981.
Egypt used “small amounts” of nuclear material to conduct experiments
related to producing plutonium and enriched uranium, according to the
report. Irradiating uranium in nuclear reactors produces plutonium,
which then can be separated from the spent nuclear fuel by
“reprocessing” technology. Uranium enrichment increases the
concentration of the uranium-235 isotope to produce both low-enriched
uranium, which is used by most nuclear reactors, as well as highly enriched uranium (HEU). HEU and plutonium are also the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons.
Egypt, however, does not appear to have made much progress on either
front and does not possess either reprocessing or uranium-enrichment
facilities. (See ACT, January/February 2005.)
Cairo explained its reporting failures in a Jan. 25 press statement,
asserting that the government and the IAEA had “differing
interpretations” of Egypt’s safeguards obligations and emphasizing that
the country’s “nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes.”
Egypt pursued a nuclear weapons option in the 1960s, but its efforts did
not advance far.
According to the report, the IAEA’s investigation began after examining
“open source documents” published by current and former Egyptian Atomic
Energy Authority officials that indicated undeclared nuclear activities.
The agency first raised the issue with Egyptian officials in September
2004 and subsequently conducted several inspections of Egypt’s nuclear
facilities. ElBaradei, an Egyptian national, obliquely referred to the
investigation in a November statement to the agency’s Board of
The IAEA is still analyzing environmental samples from relevant Egyptian
facilities, as well as otherwise verifying Egypt’s accounts of its
nuclear activities, the report says.
The agency is also investigating whether Egypt received assistance from a uranium-enrichment technology
procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official Abdul
Qadeer Khan, a diplomat in Vienna familiar with the investigation told Arms Control Today
Feb. 19. The Egypt probe is part of a broader inquiry into whether a
number of other countries—Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and
Syria—were involved in the network, the diplomat said. The network’s
known customers include Iran, Libya, and North Korea.
ElBaradei said in a Feb. 4 interview with Arms Control Today that Khan’s
network may have had additional “satisfied or unsatisfied customers,”
but he did not name any specific countries.
The IAEA report contains no evidence that Egypt received any assistance
from the Khan network. Press reports, as well as U.S. and Israeli
officials, have named other countries as possible customers of Khan’s
network, but the publicly available evidence is thin.
ElBaradei’s report does not provide specific dates for all of Egypt’s
nuclear experiments but does say that some nuclear activities took place
“between 15 and 40 years ago.”
The report states that Egypt conducted uranium-conversion experiments before 1982
but does not provide an exact date. Converting uranium oxide into other
uranium compounds is a key step in the uranium-enrichment process.
Egypt failed to report that it had produced “small amounts” of uranium
compounds, including uranium tetrafluoride, to the IAEA. Converting
uranium tetrafluoride into uranium hexafluoride is the last step to
producing feedstock for uranium enrichment. Although Arms Control Today
previously reported that Egypt had experimented with uranium
hexafluoride, the country apparently did not do so.
The equipment used in the conversion processes has been “largely dismantled,” the report says.
Egypt also failed to include both imported and domestically produced
nuclear material in its 1982 initial declaration to the IAEA, according
to the report. The imported material included 67 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride and approximately 9 kilograms of thorium compounds.
Although no nuclear plants currently use thorium, it can be irradiated to produce uranium-233, which can also be theoretically used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
Egypt also failed to declare that it had imported and produced a total
of 3 kilograms of uranium metal. Uranium metal is used as the explosive
core in some nuclear weapons, but the metal Egypt produced could not be
used for that purpose.
Egypt used its two research reactors, which are under IAEA safeguards,
to irradiate “small amounts of natural uranium” between 1990 and 2003,
conducting a total of 16 experiments, the reports says. Egypt also
irradiated thorium in one of its reactors. Egypt dissolved the
irradiated material but did not extract any uranium or plutonium.
Dissolving irradiated nuclear material is a key step in separating fissile material from spent nuclear fuel.
According to ElBaradei’s report, Egypt conducted “similar experiments”
between 1982 and 1988, as well as before 1982, but Egyptian officials
have not been able to locate the relevant documentation. The
“continuing” irradiation experiments will now be under agency
safeguards, the report says. The radioisotopes that could be produced by
such experiments potentially have a number of civilian uses, including
Egypt also imported nuclear fuel rods containing enriched uranium to
conduct experiments related to plutonium separation, the report says.
Egypt did not report either the material or the experiments, which
occurred prior to 1982, to the IAEA.
ElBaradei’s report also states that Egypt contracted with a “foreign company”
in the late 1970s to build a pilot plant for conducting experiments
involving the separation of plutonium and uranium from irradiated
reactor fuel. Egypt tested the facility in 1987 with domestically produced nuclear material,
but Cairo declared neither the tests nor the material to the IAEA, the
report says. Egypt was unable to complete the facility, which is now
being used for an unrelated project.
Additionally, the IAEA is also analyzing Egypt’s explanation for
“traces” of nuclear material found in IAEA environmental samples taken
from Egyptian hot cells. Hot cells are shielded rooms useful for separating plutonium.
The IAEA first inquired about the sample results in 2001. Egypt
responded in 2003, telling the agency that the particles came from
contaminated reactor water.
ElBaradei’s report also notes that Cairo failed to disclose relevant
information about its nuclear facilities. Egypt failed to declare the
pilot plant for plutonium and uranium-separation experiments, as well as failed to provide design information for a new facility under construction. The latter facility is to be used for separating radioisotopes from enriched uranium,
which is to be irradiated in one of Egypt’s research reactors. Cairo
should have notified the IAEA in 1997 of its decision to build the
facility, according to the report
و من التقرير السابق يلاحظ
The imported material included 67 kilograms of uranium tetrafluoride and approximately 9 kilograms of thorium compounds
اى ماده كافيه لصناعه ما يوازى 3 قنابل نوويه
ويكفي هذا التصريح من الرئيس المصري السابق حسني مبارك
In October 1998, Mubarak said that Egypt could, if need be, develop nuclear weapons, or even buy the technology
وبشكل عام انظروا هذا التقرير
Does Egypt have clandestine nuclear and chemical weapons programs that
could be turned on if the Arab world’s most populous country feels
threatened by neighbors?
In the last several weeks, both the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have disclosed secret
Egyptian operations in both areas — experiments in the development of
plutonium and uranium fuel cycles as well as evidence of sophisticated
chemical weapons help that was given to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Neither report suggests that Egypt is going to deploy nuclear or
chemical weapons, but the revelations once again raise concerns that the
U.S. ally has its own superweapons programs.
“Egypt has wanted to have it very different ways,” said David Albright,
president of the Institute for Science in International Security and a
former IAEA inspector himself. “It wants to be seen as a responsible
member of the world community, but it also is afraid of what Israel
has,” meaning a nuclear arsenal.
And with Iran also believed to be developing nuclear weapons and Libya
admitting it once had such ambitions, Albright and others fear Egypt is
quietly preparing for all eventualities.
Of the two new revelations, the nuclear concern has received more attention.
Failure to report nuke experiments
In February, the IAEA quietly criticized Egypt for failing to report a
variety of nuclear experiments for more than 20 years. The agency noted
that Egypt had used “small amounts” of nuclear material to conduct
experiments related to producing plutonium and enriched uranium, both of
which can be used to make nuclear weapons.
While the uranium experiments appear to have been 20 or more years old, the plutonium experiments were much recent.
The nuclear-armed planet
According to the report, between 1990 and 2003 Egypt used its two
research reactors at Inshas in the Nile Delta to irradiate “small
amounts of natural uranium,” conducting a total of 16 experiments.
According to the IAEA, none of the experiments fully succeeded; but in
each case, they should have been reported to the agency under terms of
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
Finally, Egypt had to admit that it had not fully disclosed the extent of its nuclear facilities.
It failed to declare the pilot plant used for the plutonium and
uranium-separation experiments and did not provide design information
for a new facility under construction, also at Inshas.
This facility could be used for more extensive experiments, the IAEA
believed, and noted that Cairo should have notified the IAEA of its
decision eight years ago.
Chided, but not accused of clandestine action
The IAEA declared the lapses a “matter of concern” and promised to pursue verification.
“The agency’s verification of the correctness and completeness of
Egypt’s declarations is ongoing, pending further results of
environmental and destructive sampling analyses and the agency’s
analysis of the additional information provided by Egypt,” the report
Still the IAEA did not accuse Egypt of having a clandestine nuclear
weapons program and the Egyptian government, in a statement issued in
response, tried to downplay the concern, claiming “differing
interpretations” of Egypt’s safeguards obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty had led to the problems.
And Cairo continued to emphasize that its “nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes.”
Albright and others are not so certain.
Cause for concern?
“Egypt has been playing games and it just doesn’t fly that they didn’t
know what they had to report. They knew, but didn’t want to report it,
and the elimination of this doesn’t eliminate the concern,” Albright
said. “Egypt is developing very slowly a capability if they decide to go
William M. Arkin, an NBC News analyst, said that Egypt’s revelations
show that “it had gone a lot farther than Iran” in terms of
experimentation with separation of plutonium, adding that if the United
States had discovered such experiments in Iran, it would no doubt be
raising the stakes in the current standoff with Tehran.
One reason Arkin and others cite for the seeming imbalance in criticism
for the two countries’ nuclear advances is the U.S.-Egypt relationship.
The U.S. has provided Egypt with $1.3 billion a year in military aid
since the Camp David peace accords in 1979, as well as an average of
$815 million a year in economic assistance.
By most estimates, Egypt has received more than $50 billion in U.S. aid
since 1975 and has proven one of the most reliable U.S. allies in the
war on terror.
In fact, Albright, Arkin and National Defense University researcher
Judith Yaphe believe that there is a connection between Iran’s nuclear
ambitions and those of Egypt.
Efforts to counter Iranian program
Yaphe, who has written extensively on the effect an Iranian nuclear
weapon would have on other countries in the Middle East, says part of
the issue is pride.
“How can you, as an Egyptian, sit by and let Iran go past you in this
area? For Egyptian scientists, it’s a loss of face,” Yaphe said.
“Egyptians look very hard at what Iran has done. Iran has the money, but
you don’t need a lot of money if you already have the basic
Albright agreed that Iran is driving Egyptian plans, but suggests it’s
more about strategy than pride. “Now, they have to be worried about
Iran, as well as Israel.”
A former senior U.S. intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
anonymity, noted that it may not just be Iran and Israel that worry
Egyptian defense officials.
“They now know that Libya, with whom they have had volatile relations
the past two decades, had a nuclear program under way,” the official
said, noting Libya’s admissions that it had acquired nuclear weapons
development technology from Pakistan in the 1990’s.
Cairo has admitted pursuing option in the past
Egypt has admitted that in the 1960’s it pursued the nuclear option as
it learned more about Israel’s nuclear program, which by 1966 had
produced its first atomic bombs. At that point, they would have been
targeted against Egyptian cities.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, in fact, has on occasion been willing
to raise the possibility of a nuclear Egypt. In October 1998, Mubarak
said that Egypt could, if need be, develop nuclear weapons, or even buy
the technology. But then, as always, he dismissed the idea.
"If the time comes when we need nuclear weapons, then we will not
hesitate. I say if we have to, because this is the last thing we think
about," Mubarak said in remarks to the London-based al-Hayat newspaper.
"(But) we do not think now of joining the nuclear club,” Mubarak said.
"Acquiring material for nuclear weapons has become very easy and it can
The United States now believes that Mubarak’s reference to being able to
buy nuclear technology was not just an off-hand remark. The statement
seems to coincide with a secret offer by Pakistan’s best-known nuclear
scientist, A. Q. Khan, to help Egypt.
Khan made similar offers to North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, with North Korea, Iran and Libya accepting his help.
Support for Saddam
Meantime, the CIA report on chemical weapons' support to Iraq indicates
that the Egyptian arms industry was sophisticated enough to allow Cairo
to help Baghdad to make “technological leaps” in the 1980s, as Arab Iraq
was battling Persian Iran.
The report is the first that publicly describes the extent of the
support. In the early 1990s, Egypt declined to help the U.N. inspectors.
In fact, say inspectors from the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM), Egypt was the only major Iraqi arms supplier not to cooperate
with the United Nations.
Some U.S. officials believe that if the Egyptians had turned over data
about what they supplied to Saddam Hussein, it would show the advanced
technical level of the Egyptian programs.
Now with the Iraqi archives open to the CIA, the extent of the Egyptian
help, as well as Egypt’s own capabilities, have become public.
The report, little noticed until the Associated Press wrote about it
last week, stated that in 1981, after the outbreak of war with Iran, the
Iraqi government paid Egypt $12 million "in return for assistance with
production and storage of chemical weapons agents." The information was
contained in a little-noticed annex of their Comprehensive Report, a
350,000-word document issued last October.
Specifically, the CIA noted that, “During the early years, Egyptian
scientists provided consultation, technology, and oversight allowing
rapid advances and technological leaps in weaponization. With the
Iran-Iraq war well under way, Egypt assisted Iraq in CW production,”
making modifications to rocket systems to permit the warheads to store
chemical agents, sending Iraq specially modified rockets with plastic
inserts ideal for chemical weapons disbursal, and even sending its own
chemical weapons experts to assist in developing sarin munitions.
The final point is the best indicator of the Egyptian chemical weapons development, according to military experts.
Iraqi sarin production soared
Sarin is a nerve agent, one of the more advanced military chemicals in
the world. Prior to the mid-1980s, Iraq's arsenal was limited to mustard
gas and other disfiguring agents. Sarin was used extensively by Iraq to
kill Kurdish dissidents in the north as well as Iranian soldiers in the
And not long after the Egyptian scientists arrived in Iraq, sarin
production soared. From five tons in 1984, Iraqi sarin production rose
to 209 tons in 1987 and 394 tons in 1988, the report says.
"We were aware from back in 1991 that there was a link between Iraq and
Egypt on chemical weapons," Ron G. Manley of Britain, a former senior
U.N. adviser on chemical weapons, told the Associated Press. He said the
warhead inserts, an Egyptian design, were an early clue.
And as military historians note, Egypt has been willing to use chemical
weapons, being along with Iraq and Iran the only nations in recent
memory to employ them. In its intervention in the 1960s Yemen civil war,
Egypt repeatedly used mustard gas bombs on royalist forces in the
Cairo has, however, denied any involvement in Iraq's program. "Egypt had
no relation whatsoever with Iraq in the field of chemical weapons,"
Embassy spokesman Hisham Elnakib said.
16 تجربة نووية في 13 سنة فقط!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
تبقى تقريران لم استطيع الحصول عليهم لحذف الصفحات التى يحتويها و ان شاء الله يضعها الاخ ميج حين عودته